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he fall issue of Regulation contains a
provocative attempt by University of Cal-
ifornia, Berkeley law professor Peter
Menell to discredit what he calls the prop-
erty rights movement (prm) for its sup-
posed “absolutist” stance on intellectual
property (“Intellectual Property and the
Property Rights Movement”). As part of the article, Professor
Menell projects the image that I participate in (or perhaps
even lead) a movement that poses a profound danger to the
efficient operation of our complex system of intellectual
property law, especially as it relates to patents and copyrights.
In general, I do not like to think of myself as part of any
“movement” because politics is not my business. I am con-
cerned only with stating my own positions as best I can and
not with making the compromises necessary to gain politi-
cal support. But for these purposes, I shall acquiesce in this
characterization in order to challenge what is, at the end of
the day, only a one-count indictment, which is that people of
my ilk do a great public disservice by championing the
unthinking extension of rigid notions of law for tangible
property to the more nuanced domain of intellectual prop-
erty. In Professor Menell’s mind, the great intellectual vice of
the prm is to “‘port’ the absolutist libertarian vision to the
realm of intellectual property.” 
Professor Menell’s initial exhibit of this regrettable ten-
dency is not any piece of academic writing by me or anyone
else. Rather, he quotes from an advertisement that the Wash-
ington Legal Foundation placed on the New York Times opin-
ion page on May 21, 2007, under the title “Stolen Property,
Richard A. Epstein is the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of
Law at the University of Chicago Law School and the Peter and Kirsten Senior
Fellow for the Hoover Institution.
Stolen Future.” The alleged vice of this ad was to “blithely”
create an equivalence between tangible and intangible prop-
erty by asking: 
What if strangers showed up in your backyard and held a
block party? America’s fiercely defended tradition of private
property rights wouldn’t tolerate this. But that is in essence
what’s happened to the intellectual property . . . of
American business overseas.
This statement is not as foolish as Menell indicates if one takes
the time to read the rest of the ad. The organization was not
talking about the fine points of intellectual property law that
occupy appellate judges. Rather, it was issuing a call to action
to public officials against the serious problems of the whole-
sale piracy of American intellectual property abroad and the
introduction of counterfeit drugs and surgical devices into the
United States. The ad was right to insist that widespread
counterfeiting may put ordinary people in peril of their lives
and it was equally correct to insist that systematic piracy
results in a massive disruption of the economic system by
rewarding wrongdoers who have contributed nothing to
wealth creation. Whatever the differences between tangible and
intangible property, none of them matter for the urgent prob-
lem of devising effective countermeasures to piracy and coun-
terfeiting. The transference of sentiment from tangible to
intangible property looks quite good in this particular setting.
I believe Professor Menell would not disagree with any of the
particular concerns raised in the advertisement. 
Menell’s concerns also touch sensitive political issues, for he
upbraids the prm for seeing “in the Constitution’s Takings
Clause uncompromising protection of property, founded in lib-
erty” in its criticism (along with the vast majority of the Amer-
ican people) of the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City
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of New London. But he misconstrues the prm’s key objection.
The amicus brief that I prepared with Mark Moller, then of the
Cato Institute, in Kelo did not argue that the takings clause
gives absolute protection to private property from govern-
ment takeover; after all, the clause gives explicit authorization
of government takings for public use. But what counts as pub-
lic use? The term clearly includes all takings where the prop-
erty is to be used for state-run activities for the public at large,
and even those — e.g., railroads — that are privately owned but
are under a common carrier obligation to take all comers. 
Indeed, we insisted that the public-use requirement also
allowed the government to respond intelligently to a genuine
holdout problem even when universal public access was not
guaranteed as of right. Specifically, we recognized that the gov-
ernment could authorize takings for private use so long as the
holdout problem was real and the subjective value of the
property taken was negligible. Those twin conditions are sat-
isfied, for example, when the owner of a mine needs to mount
an aerial tram over scrub land to reach the nearest railroad line.
But tragically, Ms. Kelo’s situation was exactly the reverse:
she had an intense attachment to her home that blocked no
development project. Our simple plea was to hold off throw-
ing people out of their homes for land that will (and still
does) remain barren. Menell never explains why this position
is dogmatic. 
The obvious question is how do Menell’s misguided broad-
sides reveal the supposed intellectual naiveté of the prm? Its
sins are apparently of two sorts. The first involves the overall
structure of property law. The second involves the structure
of patent law, with special attention given to the question
raised in eBay v. MercExchange of whether, in Menell’s words,
it is proper to insist that “the MercExchange patent deserved
much the same protection as real estate.”
PARITY BETWEEN TANGIBLE  
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Professor Menell’s initial error is to offer an oversimplified and
incorrect general analysis of the relationship between tangi-
ble and intellectual property. He believes that the absolutist
view that governs tangible assets does not work well for intan-
gible ones. In this analysis, he makes two errors: he assumes
that tangible property relies on absolutist conceptions, and he
denies the instructive parallels between the two systems when
they are properly understood. 
Menell mistakenly attributes to me an effort to “shoehorn
intellectual property into an idealized Blackstonian concep-
tion of property as exclusive and inviolate.” He references
Blackstone’s famous sentence that speaks of private proper-
ty as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”
Unfortunately, Professor Menell has hit the wrong target, for
I explicitly reject the Blackstonian conception of tangible
property. By way of example, my 2001 Indiana Law Journal
paper “Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Fron-
tiers” criticizes Blackstone for his “injudicious overgeneral-
ization” that overlooks the wide variety of differences in var-
ious forms of tangible property. Most concretely, Blackstone
recognizes that water is incapable of absolute ownership but
instead is subject only to “temporary, transient, usufructuary
property.” The overall situation is even more complex than
Blackstone’s account, for outside England there are multiple
property rights regimes of water, each of which has distinctive
features that are heavily dependent on the topology of differ-
ent regions. The system of riparian rights that works with gen-
tle English streams is wasteful for raging western rivers whose
riparians are located on bluffs 100 or more feet above the
water. I further noted that the efficient solutions for oil and
gas extraction also do not follow the land paradigm, given the
flowing nature of the underground resources. 
Next, I sought to explain why the vaunted exclusivity of
land is subject to serious and principled qualifications. The
law of nuisance explicitly allows for deviation from strict
boundary rights between neighbors. The live-and-let-live rules
permit all landowners to engage in certain low-level nui-
sances that result in physical invasions of their neighbors’
land on the grounds that each benefits more from the pro-
ductive activity than they suffer from the trivial invasion of
their space. High transactions costs preclude reaching this
equilibrium position through voluntary negotiations, which
is why these reciprocal easements have long been imposed as
a matter of law. In the opposite direction, the need for later-
al support between landowners is so imperative that the law
imposes reciprocal obligations of support between neigh-
bors. Finally, in circumstances of necessity, one individual may
enter the property of another without his permission, even
though he is subsequently required to compensate the prop-
erty owner for any damages so caused and any (usually small)
rental fees involved. 
The exceptions to the Blackstone claim also include com-
mon property such as highways and beaches that are open to
all. Similarly, transportation and communication systems,
even if privately owned, operate as open access regimes that
require their operators to offer service on reasonable terms to
all comers. Nor do the forms of property interests remain stat-
ic in the face of technological changes. The relaxation of the
Blackstone rules with respect to overflight rights or electro-
magnetic transmissions marks an important and principled
deviation from Blackstone’s principle of exclusivity. 
This mixed conception of property entitlements is not
confined to tangible property but also extends to the entire
realm of cyberspace, which depends on the same distinction
between the open elements of the system — the Internet high-
way — and the private sites that connect up to it. The key
point on the Internet is that no person is allowed to disrupt
communications along its common elements, but that an
open access regime hardly precludes the use of strong legal
protection for the individual sites that connect to the com-
mon element. This proper structure of cyberspace came to a
head in the much-discussed 2003 Intel v. Hamidi decision in
which Intel sought to get an injunction against former
employee Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi’s repeated and unau-
thorized use of its servers to spread messages of fear and dis-
cord to Intel employees. Intel argued that it was entitled to
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enjoin that use, just as it could prevent Hamidi from speak-
ing in its lobby or going door-to-door inside its offices and
factories. That argument succeeded in the California inter-
mediate court, which held that Intel was not only entitled to
use self-help to block the messages from coming into its
servers, but also to enjoin any person whom it specifically
instructed to cease sending e-mails into its site.
One doctrinal obstacle to Intel’s position is that the law
has generally not awarded injunctions against trespass to
chattels in the absence of physical harm, such as disruption
of the server, even though it routinely awards them to tres-
passes against land. Those precedents, however, never
involved the complex operations of cyberspace, but only
covered such isolated actions as lifting a dog up by its ears,
where the simple response is to lead the dog out of harm’s
way. The California Supreme Court (by a 4–3 vote) took the
wooden position that the rules that governed ordinary chat-
tels applied equally to cyberspace and denied the injunction
while recognizing Intel’s right to use self-help to keep
unwanted messages off its servers. 
In so doing, it explicitly rejected the argument that I
made in an amicus brief that cyberspace should be regard-
ed as a complex system like land, such that no one could
block access to the Internet generally but anyone could
enjoin the unauthorized use of his own particular site. The
point quite simply was that the same division of private and
common property that existed in physical space should be
carried over to cyberspace. In making its conclusion, the
court invoked an incorrect analogy between unauthorized
use and the transmissions of radio signals in real space.
With respect to telecommunications, the property rights
are shifted entirely so that no one can use self-help to jam
signals that go over his property. It never explained why, if
self-help was allowed for unauthorized use cases, the injunc-
tion should be denied when those measures failed. In addi-
tion, it raised the bogeyman that injunctive relief in this case
would stop all Internet communications unless permission
was first obtained from the website owner. In so doing, the
Court misstated the rules on communications by ordinary
mail and phone service, where the rule is that one can send
any kind of letter or make any kind of phone call until
explicitly instructed by the property owner not to do so.
Intel gave Hamidi explicit notice on multiple occasions. And
finally, the California Court uttered the quite preposterous
statement that the term “Internet” has nothing to do with
network industries because the term “net” derives from a
“fishnet” or chattel. The result of its decision was to encour-
age “cat and mouse” games between invader and owner,
when an efficient system would allow an owner to avoid the
huge expense of self-help by obtaining legal assistance
against a known intruder.
CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH  The point of this exercise
is to show that all complex property systems, wherever locat-
ed, require some mix of absolute and common elements to
maximize the value of the underlying resources. Stated oth-
erwise, my supposed absolutist position is anything but. One
starts off with land (but not water) with the presumption that
the right to exclude, use, and dispose of property is absolute.
But in the next breath the law subjects that initial presump-
tion to scrutiny in order to find those situations where the
reconfiguration of rights, as in the cases mentioned, will lead
to overall social improvements, typically by increasing in high
transaction cost settings the value of property entitlements
through the forced transformation of property rights. The
overt program, as I have said on countless occasions, is instru-
mental and consequentialist. The libertarian conception of
property rights often associated with Locke and Blackstone
plays a key role in the grand scheme by setting the initial
baseline against which all future modifications of property law
should be measured. But no one thinks that those rights are
such sacred absolutes that no deviation is possible, even to deal
with frictions at the boundary lines or the facilitation of
transportation and communication networks. 
None of those critical permutations, however, leave prop-
erty rights in perpetual limbo, for they do not call into ques-
tion the basic notion that no individual may just treat some-
one else’s property as if it were his own. Of course, it makes
perfect sense to allow planes to fly far above occupied land.
That said, it makes no sense to allow them to land wherever
they please, even if they pay a license fee determined thereafter
by the state. Power companies may be entitled to condemn
easements to run their wires, but not to occupy private homes.
Hamidi can send whatever messages he likes over the Internet,
but not to e-mail addresses that have sent him a “do not
enter” message. For all ordinary interactions between neigh-
bors, large physical invasions should be — and are — treated
as per se wrongs. In virtually every case, a property owner is
allowed to regain possession of his property from the entrant
and to recover damages for interim losses. 
UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Professor Menell’s false charges that the prm adheres to Black-
stone’s model of property rights as “perpetual, exclusive, and
inviolate” leads him to attribute strange positions to his adver-
saries that they do not in fact hold. Here are some examples: 
Initially, Professor Menell notes that many libertarians
think that all forms of intellectual property are suspect, given
the limitations that they place on the ability of ordinary peo-
ple to speak their mind and to use their labor as they see fit.
The point is both true and ironic. True, because there are
many libertarians who are not consequentialists and who
therefore do not see how the systematic protection of intel-
lectual property works to the long-term advantage of us all.
Ironic, because it appears that some libertarians afford
absolute protection to a species of property that other liber-
tarians refuse to recognize at all. But in the next breath, Menell
misreads the political tea leaves by calling the prm “antigov-
ernment,” which is not so. I rely on the state to enforce the
complex set of intellectual property rights. 
Professor Menell next claims that the limited duration of
patents and copyrights is inconsistent with the perpetual
duration of real property. But he never identifies just who
defends unlimited property rights in patents and copyrights.
60 REGULATION W I N T E R  2 0 0 8
RegW08_P58-63.Final  12/10/07  12:05 PM  Page 60
My own position on the issue is identical to his. With copy-
rights and patents, perpetual rights are more costly than with
land because inventions and writings can be used by many peo-
ple at one time, so limited terms are fully justified. (Interest-
ingly enough, nonrivalrous use is not a feature of trademarks,
trade names, and trade secrets, which is why they receive and
deserve permanent protection). From the outset, for example,
I have been an outspoken opponent of the Copyright Term
Extension Act that Congress passed in 1998 as a sop to the
Gershwin Estate and the Disney Corporation. The duration
of copyrights (at life of the creator plus 75 years) is entirely too
long. No commercial interest should ever be tied to the life of
its creator, which means that a young author receives, on aver-
age, far greater protection for his works than an older one. Yet
at the same time I have been strongly critical of the very short
periods of effective use that are available to patents in some
critical areas, such as pharmaceuticals, where roughly half
the officially allotted 20-year term is lost in clinical trials and
regulation delays, even with the limited extensions that are
allowed under the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
But what does limited life have to do with the overall struc-
ture of patents and copyrights? Menell notes, correctly, that
patent law has many different “levers” by which to adjust the
incentives extended to inventors. He fails, though, to under-
stand how the levers interact. Strong property protection via
injunctions during a limited patent life spurs innovation,
which also means that inventions enter the public domain
more quickly on expiration. By cutting down the patent yield
during the initial protected period, MercExchange makes it
highly unlikely that an inventor can recoup his expenditures
in the short period allowed, which translates into fewer inven-
tions in the follow-on period. So long as it is possible to make
the appropriate adjustments on patent length, why fiddle
with other dimensions of patent protection in ways that intro-
duce various kinds of uncertainty, especially the valuation
issues associated with compulsory licenses? Just where does
the prm fall down here?
Professor Menell also notes that patent law has its experi-
mental use limitation (for Hatch-Waxman) and copyright has
its fair use limitations. The law of tangible property also has
its privileges, so it is no far stretch to allow similar well-defined
privileges to arise in both copyright and patent law. Menell
claims that it is a “substantial exaggeration to suggest that
‘exclusivity’ of rights in the intellectual property context mir-
rors that concept in the real property context.” But, as shown,
exclusivity in real property is far less absolute than he claims,
especially since the case for taking real property under eminent
domain is far more powerful for land than it is for any form
of intellectual property. I doubt, for instance, that any mem-
ber of the prm wants literary critics to be able to criticize an
author only with his or her express consent, or to cast aside
the experimental use privilege under Hatch-Waxman. It makes
good sense to allow the new entrant to prepare for sale, but
not to market, a competing product during the original prod-
uct’s exclusivity period so that he can hit the ground running
once the patent has run its course. It is instructive that Menell
does not cite any prm theorist to attack these propositions
that he supports, because none do.
Next, Menell does not specify his supposed objections to
the prm. Rather he gives a general, efficiency-based account
of how various forms of intellectual property should be
devised in light of the various tradeoffs that have to be made
— none of which has anything to do with either the Wash-
ington Legal Foundation attack on pirates and counterfeiters
or with the injunction question raised in MercExchange. There-
after his more diffuse discussion of a number of disconnect-
ed topics further undermines his critique of the prm.
Finally, Professor Menell stresses yet again that, with prop-
erty rights, one size need not fit all. This is a proposition that
I have often defended. One example is the difference between
pharmaceutical patents and genomic patents, a topic on which
I have written elsewhere at length. Unlike pharmaceutical
patents, genomic patents seek to gain protection for natural sub-
stances. The protection of “isolated and purified” substances
dates back to Learned Hand’s 1911 decision in Parke-Davis & Co.
v. H.K. Mulford Co. that treated isolated adrenalin as a new
“composition of matter” that was able to be protected from oth-
ers who isolated the identical substance by different means. Two
generations later, that decision spurred on the vital genetic rev-
olution. But, as I have argued elsewhere, protection has gone
overboard insofar as it allows those persons who have isolated
the brca gene for breast cancer to patent not only its use out-
side the body, but to prevent persons from receiving treatment
of their own genetic disorders without the approval of the gene
patent holder. That protection is too broad. Gene patents
should be limited to those substances that are in a commer-
cialized test tube, not those that remain locked in a cell.
EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE, AT LAST
We are at last in a position to address the Supreme Court’s
unfortunate decision in MercExchange, which inspired Menell
to pen his critique. Among my transgressions as “one of the
REGULATION W I N T E R  2 0 0 8    61
Gene patents should be limited to those 
substances that are in a commercialized test tube, 
not those that remain locked in a cell.
RegW08_P58-63.Final  12/10/07  12:05 PM  Page 61
P R O P E R T Y
prm’s leading theorists” — he mentions no one else by name
in the article — is coauthoring an amicus brief with Scott
Kieff and Polk Wagner in the 2006 Supreme Court case. 
The precise issue in MercExchange was whether a plaintiff was
entitled to an injunction as a matter of course against a defen-
dant who has been found to have infringed the plaintiff’s
patent. The injunction, of course, is a direct order that the
defendant no longer infringe, backed by the power to hold
those who violate it in contempt of court. The point of our dis-
cussion of encroachment in real property cases was to stress
that there was much case law support for the sensible propo-
sition that deliberate and substantial invasions of property
should lead to an order to cease and desist. For land, this
demand could require encroachers to rip down expensive build-
ings unless they pay a king’s ransom to the property owner to
purchase a license to maintain their structure. The severe sanc-
tions are justified because they preserve voluntary markets by
giving potential builders good reason to stay on their side of
the boundary line unless they have purchased the permission
to enter someone else’s land. Some exceptions might be made
for trivial incursion done by inadvertence, but any wholesale
violation of property rights is subject to that rule.
This set of institutional arrangements does not carry over
perfectly to patent cases where the fact of infringement is
harder to determine outside the piracy context, owing to the
lack of clear boundaries that surround any patent. But in
MercExchange, the Supreme Court was not asked to reexamine
the soundness of any factual determination on patent scope
or validity; instead the Court decided what remedy is gener-
ally appropriate when the deliberate and substantial infringe-
ments of patents have been found to take place. Our argument
was that the injunction was preferable to any damage award
for at least three reasons: 
First, there are real difficulties in calculating the damages
owed to the plaintiff. Just the change in market structure
brought about by the admission of an illegal competitor
makes those calculations difficult because the patentee is
entitled to receive his monopoly profits as an inducement for
early development. 
Second, any system of damages allows countless individuals
to infringe the patent, which in turn undercuts the ability to
maintain a coherent system of voluntary licenses either on an
exclusive or nonexclusive basis. It makes little or no sense to put
to the patent owner the task of suing countless infringers, some
of whom could not pay damages when found responsible. 
And third, systematic under-compensation during the lim-
ited life of a patent is likely to reduce the level of innovation while
increasing the administrative costs of running the entire system. 
Our position did not represent the majority view among
patent professors, which was expressed in a brief authored by
Mark Lemley of Stanford Law School that was signed by 52
law professors, including Professor Menell. Their brief did
not argue that injunctions are never appropriate in patent
infringement cases, but insisted that the proper approach
was to apply what they deemed to be the traditional rules of
equity courts (i.e., those courts that were charged with admin-
istering injunctions). Those rules are said to use a fourfold test
to answer this particular question:
■ Is there irreparable harm if the injunction is not
issued?
■ Does the plaintiff have an adequate remedy at law
that is in the form of monetary damages?
■ Would granting the injunction be in the public
interest?
■ Does the balance of hardship tip in favor of the
plaintiff?
The first two points really ask the same question in two dif-
ferent ways. The critical question in social terms is what is
gained by inviting courts to throw in the third and fourth
points. In our view, the additional inquiries, which are expen-
sive to maintain, rarely have any weight and simply allow the
obfuscation of the issue of whether the right to exclude that
the patent law grants on its face should be undermined by
costly hearings on a myriad of factors. High administrative
costs and added legal uncertainty hardly serve the cause of
technical progress that Professor Menell champions, and that
he thinks that I and others of the prm persuasion oppose. 
There is, to be sure, an important class of cases in which the
injunction might be denied. Those cases involve certain com-
plex arrangements, such as computer programs that contain
thousands of separate components that could each be covered
by a separate patent. In those cases of fragmented ownership,
any inadvertent infringement might well tip the balance
against the automatic injunction, given the huge dislocations
that arise from shutting down an entire system for a modest
infringement. But that situation would receive the same treat-
ment in land cases. If a builder assembled hundreds of plots
to build a major project only to discover that he had not
taken title from the proper owner of one postage-stamp plot,
I doubt very much that any court would order the entire
development to be torn down. Large damages might be award-
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ed, but the business would go on. Once again there are, on this
score, parallels between the two systems. 
What is most ironic about Professor Menell’s article is
that, apart from constantly repeating that real property par-
adigms do not work for intellectual property, he offers no prin-
cipled account of when injunctions should be issued in patent
infringement cases. He does note that some of the subse-
quent decisions have been a bit more cautious about injunc-
tions, but he offers no normative account as to why this is a
good thing. To be sure, in some cases the injunction should
be denied, as when the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed the
request for an injunction in the first place. Professor Menell
does not, however, discuss those cases that continue to issue
injunctions when the patent holder is likely to suffer a sub-
stantial decline in market share in an expanding market,
which makes it hard to recoup its business thereafter. Nor does
he comment on the significance, if any, of the fact that the
infringer had been unable to obtain a license from a patent-
ee, or that the patentee was prepared to issue one if the prop-
er amount of consideration was supplied. 
In looking over cases of garden-variety infringement, it is
hard to escape the conclusion that the entire system would be
far better off by returning to the rule adopted in the Federal
Circuit, based on earlier Supreme Court precedents, that
offered full protection in three critical cases: when the patentee
is practicing (i.e., using) the patent; when the patentee is
licensing the patent to others; and when the patentee is not
using the particular patent because the patentee has chosen
to develop an alternative product subject to patent protection.
The third case is critical, for example, with chemical patents
granted in forms that give the patentee use of multiple com-
pounds within a single class of drugs. The entire system would
fall apart if the patentee could not protect those forms that
he did not commercialize, a position that the law recognizes. 
All in all, a utilitarian should be dismayed by Professor
Menell’s defense of the discretionary rule on injunctive relief
for deliberate, major, and unjustified infringement of prop-
erty rights. We can only hope (but not confidently) that the
Supreme Court’s fashionable blunder in MercExchange will
slowly be cut back with time. Quite simply, in most routine
commercial transactions and in most litigation, the excep-
tions, qualifications, and privileges are of little consequence.
What really matters is that we develop a system of secure
property rights that allows people to transact at low cost and
high reliability. Years ago, David Hume, one of the glorious
founders of the modern utilitarian tradition, stressed the
importance of the security of expectations in voluntary trans-
actions. Nothing that Professor Menell has written about the
fine points of patent law should ever make us abandon the car-
dinal truth that injunctive relief is appropriate in the vast
number of tangible or intellectual property cases that come
before the courts today. This is no absolutist view of the world.
It is a bit of common sense that has guided courts for centuries
in both domains.
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